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ECONOMIC WRONGS AND SOCIAL RIGHTS: ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF 
SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION ON REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS IN KENYA AND THE POTENTIAL REDRESS OFFERED BY THE OPTIONAL 
PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 





I. KENYA has been consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in Africa and in the 
world. In the 2016 Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the country 
ranked 145th out of 176 countries with a score of 26 out of 100.2 The ranking was equally dismal 
in 2017 at 143rd out of 180 countries with a score of 28 out of 1003 and 144th out of 180 countries 
in 2018 with a score of 27 out of 100.4 Based on expert opinion, the CPI measures perceived levels 
of public sector corruption worldwide. Despite the enactment of various anti-corruption 
legislations in Kenya in the recent past, the situation on the ground remains grim with allegations 
of corruption having been levied against various sectors of the government5 and very few 
prosecutions being successfully mounted against the culprits6; a clear case of the government 
preaching water while wrongdoers are able to drink wine with the proceeds of corrupt dealings. 
Defendants in corruption cases have been argued to benefit from the lack of political will that 
underlies attempts to prosecute high-level corruption suspects.7 
Corruption and inequality are inextricably linked. Where there is an unequal distribution 
of power and resources in any given society as a result of factors such as corruption, it is very 
likely that the poor will bear the brunt of this state of affairs. This is especially the case where 
public resources are misappropriated for private gain. This has dire implications for the ability of 
                                                 
* Lecturer (on leave), Faculty of Law, Riara University, Nairobi, U.S.A; and Ph.D. Candidate, Georg-August 
Universität Göttingen; LLM, New York University; LLB, University of Nairobi. 
2 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 (January 2017), online:  
<https://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2016_cpireport_en?e=2496456/43483458>. 
3 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2017 (January 2018), online: 
<https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017>. 
4 Transparency International,  Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 (January 2018), online: 
<https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018>. 
5 The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), Report of Activities and Financial Statements for the 
Financial Year 2017/2018 (December 2018) at 7-11, online: <http://www.eacc.go.ke/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/EACC-Annual-Report-2017-2018.pdf>. 
6 Samuel Kimeu, “TI-Kenya Statement on the Fight against Corruption in the Country”, Transparency International 
(June 2018), online: <https://tikenya.org/ti-kenya-statement-on-the-fight-against-corruption-in-the-country/>. 
7 James Gathii, “Defining the Relationship between Corruption and Human Rights” (2009) 31: 125 U Pa J Intl L 1.  
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right holders to realize their Economic and Social Rights (hereinafter ESRs). This article does not 
advocate for a (new) human right to a corruption-free society. Such a right is neither acknowledged 
by legal practice nor is there a need for it, despite the fact that some academics have called for the 
recognition of precisely this kind of new human right.8 Rather, the key premise of the present 
research is that systemic corruption coupled with an inadequate anti-corruption framework is a 
violation of the human rights codified by the UN human rights covenants, with particular emphasis 
on ESRs. After outlining how ESRs are violated in contexts where corruption is rampant, I posit 
that victims of violations ought to and can have redress within the international human rights 
framework. 
The 2010 Constitution of Kenya has been lauded for its entrenchment of ESRs.9 However, 
progress has been slow in terms of ensuring that the holders of these constitutionally enshrined 
rights are able to enjoy their real life, tangible effects. As with many other jurisdictions, the 
Government of Kenya has argued that ESRs are subject to the caveat of progressive realization. 
For instance, in its Combined second to fifth periodic reports to the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter, the CESCR), the Kenyan Government specifically 
highlighted the fact that the Constitution of Kenya in article 21 requires the State to take legislative, 
policy and other measures to progressively achieve (emphasis added) the realization of 
ESRs.10Article 2 of the ICESCR provides that state parties to the covenant have a duty to take 
steps subject to the maximum of their available resources with a view to achieving progressively 
the full realization of the rights recognized.11 A government that fails to take suitable measures to 
deal with systemic corruption could, arguably, be said to have failed to meet the “maximum of 
available resources” requirement. This is because resources that could have been utilized towards 
the realization of ESRs are diverted to corrupt ventures that benefit the few at the expense of the 
many. The corrupt get richer and the poor get poorer.  
 
                                                 
8 Ndiva Kofele-Kale, “The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and Collective Human Right: Elevating 
Official Corruption to a Crime under International Law” (2000) 34:1 Intl Lawyer 149.  
9 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Art 43, online: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c8508822.html>. 
10 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under 
articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C/12/KEN/2-5 
(2013), online: <http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E/C.12/KEN/2-
5&Lang=en>.  
11 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966,  993 UNTS 3, online: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html>.  




This paper analyzes how the existence of corruption and an ineffective anti-corruption 
framework can be conceptualized as a violation of ESRs generally, and of specific ESRs 
particularly. The paper will then proceed to interrogate whether, if the failure of the government 
to combat corruption amounts to a breach of state obligations under the ICESCR, and whether 
there is any avenue for redress to victims at the international level. On 10 December 2008, 
coinciding with the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter, the OP-ICESCR12 This was a watershed 
moment in protecting the ESRs, as the Protocol injected much-needed optimism in the debate 
about the equal status of ESRs and the right of claimants to access justice. The OP-ICESCR came 
into force in May 2013 after the required number of state ratifications was obtained. I will argue 
in this paper that the OP-ICESCR could be harnessed as a useful instrument to hold governments 
such as the Government of Kenya to account, where they fail to properly address systemic 
corruption in their jurisdictions, because this has ramifications for realization of ESRs. 
 
II. ECONOMIC WRONGS AND THE LAW: AN OUTLINE OF CORRUPTION AND 
ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS IN KENYA 
Corruption may be defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. It is often linked to 
the misuse of public funds.13 Kenya has been described as having a culture of corruption, with the 
public institutions designed for the regulation of the relationship between citizens and the State 
being used instead for the personal enrichment of public officials (politicians and bureaucrats) and 
other corrupt private agents (individuals, groups, and businesses).14 Corruption persists in Kenya 
to the detriment of a majority of the citizenry. A compelling argument can be made for the inverse 
proportionality of corruption to the level of protection of human rights in a country. Countries with 
high levels of corruption (or high levels of corruption perception) tend to also have poor human 
rights track records.15 Kenya is no exception. Corruption and human rights violations thrive in the 
                                                 
12 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res 
63/117, UNGAOR, 63rd Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/63/117 (2009).  
13 Stephen Mutula, Wilson Muna & Geoffrey Koma, “Leadership and Political Corruption in Kenya: Analysis of the 
2010 Constitutional Provisions on the Presidency” (2013) 38:3 J Soc Political Econ Stud.  
14 Sr. Kempe Ronald Hope, “Kenya's corruption problem: causes and consequences” (2014) 52:4, Commonwealth 
Comparative Politics 493.  
15 Todd Landman, Carl Jan & Willem Schudel, “Corruption and Human Rights, Empirical Relationships and Policy 
Advice” (2007), International Council on Human Rights Policy Working Paper. 
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same environment and probably have the same root causes, such as poverty and weak 
institutions.16 
Kenya, ironically, was the first country in the world to sign and ratify the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption, UNCAC, when it was opened for signature in December 2003.17 
The then Government had just been elected on an anti-corruption platform assuring Kenyans that 
corruption would cease to be a way of life in the country.18 Almost 16 years later, Kenya is still 
considered to be among the most corrupt countries in Africa and in the world19 and arguably suffers 
from systemic or endemic corruption. Systemic corruption has been defined as a situation in which 
the major institutions and processes of the state are routinely dominated and used by corrupt 
individuals and groups, and in which most people have no alternatives to dealing with corrupt 
officials.20 Corruption in Kenya can thus be viewed as both systemic and generalized, systemic 
since it is more the rule rather than an exception, and generalized since it is not limited to just one 
sector. It spans various sectors of the economy. 
There is nothing novel in the idea of corruption in Kenya. The only novelty may lie in the 
increasingly ingenious schemes that malefactors in successive regimes have devised to loot the 
public coffers. Corruption has bedeviled Kenya since independence.21 Both the founding President 
Jomo Kenyatta (who was in office between 1963 and 1978) and his successor Daniel Arap Moi 
(who was in office between 1978 and 2002) arguably established and sustained an increasingly 
corrupt one-party authoritarian rule under the then Kenya African National Union (KANU).22 
Through KANU the two former Presidents and their collaborators were able to amass wealth at 
the expense of the populace. A system of patronage allowed certain ethnically identifiable elites 
to benefit from public funds. While the third President of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki, was elected in 
                                                 
16 Anne Peters, “Corruption and Human Rights” (2015), Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper No 20. 
17 Ibolya Losoncz and Augustine Kakeeto, “When Corruption Violates Human Rights: The Right to Food in Kenya” 
(27 March 2015), Regarding Rights,  online: <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/regarding-rights/2015/03/27/when-
corruption-violates-human-rights-the-right-to-food-in-kenya/>.  
18 Diane Riley, “KENYA: UN Convention against Corruption Gap Analysis Report and Implementation Plan” 
(October 2009), Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, online: <https://docplayer.net/48859206-Kenya-un-
convention-against-corruption-gap-analysis-report-and-implementation-plan.html>.  
19 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, online: <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018>. 
20 Elaine Byrne, The Moral and Legal Development of Corruption: Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Corruption in 
Ireland (PhD Thesis, University of Limerick, 2007) [unpublished]. 
21 Stephen Mutula, Wilson Muna & Geoffrey Koma, “Leadership and Political Corruption in Kenya: Analysis of the 
2010 Constitutional Provisions on the Presidency” (2013) 38:3 J Soc Political Econ Stud, online: 
<http://www.jspes.org/Sample_MutulaMunaKoma-Kenya.pdf>. 
22 Thomas Lansner, “Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Kenya” (2012), Freedom House, online: 
<https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Kenya%20-%20FINAL.pdf>.  




2002 on an anti-corruption platform, the optimism that heralded his coming into power could not 
withstand the winds of corruption that had plagued the country since independence. Barely two 
years after coming to power, President Kibaki’s government became engulfed in several corruption 
scandals, chief of which was the Anglo-Leasing Scandal.23 As alleged, the scam began under the 
administration of President Moi and continued under President Kibaki.24 This and other scandals 
dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the administration’s anticorruption commitment. Despite 
President Kibaki’s subsequent victory in the hotly contested 2007 elections, allegations of 
corruption dogged his government throughout his second term in office.  
Kenya experienced a new wave of buoyancy in 2010 with the promulgation of a new 
Constitution that strengthened the existing system of checks and balances. The new Constitution 
also significantly constrained executive powers and increased the protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms.25 The Constitution specifically identifies national values and principles of 
governance that are binding on all State organs and officers in the discharge of their functions. 
These values and principles include good governance, integrity, transparency and accountability.26 
Unfortunately, these more than meritorious provisions of the Constitution remain largely 
aspirational. Their implementation has been slow and inconsistent specifically with regards to 
anticorruption efforts that seem to have yielded little fruit in the fight against corruption. 
The fourth President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, and his government came into power in 
2012. The administration has since been bedeviled by several allegations of corruption. In the 
Auditor-General’s report for the fiscal year 2014/2015, it was documented that at least 16% of the 
financial statements, including revenue and spending statements from government ministries, were 
misleading. Massive corruption and excessive and unaccounted-for spending were the hallmarks 
of the report.27 Other major corruption scandals under the Uhuru Kenyatta presidency include but 
are not limited to the following: 
▪ The Eurobond scandal which erupted in June 2014 when the government floated a 
bond on the Irish stock exchange to raise money for infrastructure development in 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 “Kenyan Officials charged over Anglo Leasing Scandal”, BBC News (4 March 2015), online: 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31733052>.  
25 Lansner, supra note 22.  
26 Ibid. 
27Government of Kenya, Office of the Auditor-General, County Government Reports 2014/2015, online: 
<http://www.oagkenya.go.ke/index.php/reports/cat_view/2-reports/11-county-governments/138-county-
government-reports-2014-2015>.  
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Kenya. The Auditor General in his 2013/2014 fiscal year report declared that Sh. 
215 billion from the controversial Sh. 280 billion Eurobond funds were not 
adequately accounted for, two years after the Government claimed the cash was 
allocated to ministries.28 
▪ The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) Scandal involving the Mombasa to Nairobi 
SGR, the largest infrastructural project undertaken by the Kenyan government since 
independence. However, top bureaucrats offered contradictory and insufficient 
information on key features of the mega project including its cost to the taxpayer. 
There was a failure to comply with the requirements of the Public Procurement and 
Disposal Act in the contract awarding process. Instead of utilizing a competitive 
bidding process the successful contractor, China Roads and Bridges Corporation 
(CRBC), was awarded the contract on the basis of direct procurement. It was also 
alleged that the SGR construction cost was grossly overestimated to the detriment 
of the Kenyan taxpayers.29 
▪ The National Youth Service Scandal occurred in the Ministry of Devolution and 
Planning where conservative estimates showed that the ministry could not account 
for Sh. 791 million shillings. A special audit thereafter commissioned by the 
National Assembly’s Public Accounts Committee revealed that the amount of 
unaccounted for funds was almost double this original estimates.30 
In response to the myriad allegations of corruption levied against the current government, 
President Kenyatta reiterated his stand against corruption. He also stated that anti-corruption 
efforts are not a war against individuals or communities, rather, they are a war against a crime that 
threatens the very fabric of the nation.31However, “war on graft” statements like these are no more 
than rhetoric as new corruption cases are consistently reported. For instance, as recently as March 
                                                 
28 Government of Kenya, Office of the Auditor-General, Report of the Auditor General on the Financial Statements 
for the National Government  For the Year 2013/2014, online:  
<http://www.oagkenya.go.ke/index.php/reports/doc_download/243-report-2013-2014>.  
29 Victor Juma, “The Making of a Mega Scandal - Why Railway Figures Do not Add Up”, Daily Nation (25 January 
2014) , online: <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/g-of-a-mega-scandal/1056-2160724-ht3ijq/index.html>.  
30 Edwin Mutai, “Auditor General Says Sh. 1.9 Billion lost in NYS Scandal”, Business Daily (7 June 2016), online: 
<https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Auditor-says-Sh1-9bn-lost-in-NYS-scam/539546-3237014-
m5av1yz/index.html>. 
31 Mercy Asamba and Jael Mbogo, “Uhuru: Corruption war not targeting individuals, communities”, The Standard (5 
March 2019), online: <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001315339/uhuru-the-dead-will-not-aid-war-
against-corruption>. 




2019 major dam projects valued at Ksh.188 billion were put on hold over allegations of 
corruption.32 
As the above examples show, corruption in Kenya is multi-sectoral and affects all levels 
of government. A lingering question therefore persists. What is the reason behind these high levels 
of systemic corruption? Is it a cultural problem, manifesting the “it’s our turn to eat” mentality that 
has been argued to plague ethnic cabals once they assume the reins of government after every 
election cycle33? Or is it a question of institutional failure, where corruption can be attributed to 
the predominance of arbitrary power and a failure of the existing institutions to obey the rule of 
law34? I posit that while there are numerous reasons for the proliferation of corruption in Kenya, 
one of the biggest hindrances to effectively dealing with corruption is a lack of a coherent piece of 
legislation that consolidates anti-corruption laws in Kenya, and a failure to adequately enforce the 
existing laws and policies.  
There is no comprehensive national anti-corruption legislation or policy in Kenya. Instead, 
there currently exists a hodgepodge of policies and Acts that have been passed over the years in 
an attempt to curb corruption. The first Act of Parliament dealing with corruption was the now 
repealed 1956 Prevention of Corruption Act passed by the British colonial authorities in an effort 
to provide a legal framework for combating public corruption. This Act was amended several times 
during its lifetime. Notably, a 1997 amendment established the now defunct Kenya Anti-
Corruption Authority (KACA). KACA was disbanded in 2000 after its existence was declared 
unconstitutional by the High Court. This decision was based on a finding that the powers of KACA 
to prosecute violated Section 26 of the then Constitution which gave powers of prosecution only 
to the Attorney General.35There are numerous legislations that have been enacted since then to 
deal with corruption. The most important of these are indicated below. 
                                                 
32 Samuel Owino, “MPs suspend dam projects over corruption”, The Daily Nation (6 March 2019), online: 
<https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Dam-projects-put-on-hold-over-graft/1056-5011088-5ljegc/index.html>. 
33 Michela Wrong, It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle Blower, Reprint ed (London: Harper Perennial, 
2010).  
34 Migai Akech, “Abuse of Power and Corruption in Kenya: Will the New Constitution Enhance Government 
Accountability” (2011) 18:1 IJGLS, online: <http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol18/iss1/15>. 
35 Gachiengo v Republic [2000] 1 EA 52 (CAK) at 4. 
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In 2003, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act36and the Public Officer Ethics 
Act37 were enacted. The former Act established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) 
as the main legal body mandated to fight corruption in Kenya. The latter Act hoped to advance the 
ethics of public officers by providing for a Code of Conduct and Ethics for public officers and 
required financial declarations from certain public officers in order to enhance transparency and 
accountability of holders of public office. In 2005 the Public Procurement and Disposal Act38 was 
enacted in order to establish procedures for effective public procurement, an important objective 
in light of the fact that most public funds in Kenya are lost in the context of public procurement. 
This Act was however repealed by the coming into force of the Public Procurement and Asset 
Disposal Act of 2015.39 On March 3, 2017 the President signed into law the Proceeds of Crime 
and Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Bill40  which is the latest amendment to the Proceeds 
of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act.41During the signing ceremony, he reportedly noted that 
“this is a major tool in our sustained efforts to fight corruption. It means that no proceeds of theft 
and corruption are beyond the reach of the State.”42  
The 2010 Kenya Constitution required Parliament to enact legislation that establishes an 
independent body to ensure compliance with and enforcement of its Chapter Six requirements on 
Leadership and Integrity.43 Pursuant to this Article, Parliament enacted the Ethics and Anti-
Corruption Commission Act44 which came into effect on 5th September 2011. The Act amended 
the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act by repealing the provisions establishing KACC and 
its Advisory Board, while retaining all other provisions relating to corrupt offences and economic 
                                                 
36 Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (KEN) No 3 of 2003, online: <http://www.eacc.go.ke/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/aceca.pdf>. 
37 Public Officer Ethics Act (KEN), No 4 of 2003, ch. 183, online: 
<http://www.kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/PublicOfficerEthicsAct.pdf>. 
38 The Public Procurement and Disposal Act  (KEN), 2005, ch. 412C, online: 
<http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/PublicProcurementandDisposalAct_Cap412C_.pdf>. 
39 Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (KEN), No 33 of 2015, online: <http://ppoa.go.ke/202-the-public-
procurement-and-disposal-act-2015>. 
40 Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act (KEN), 2017, online: 
<http://frc.go.ke/downloads/category/2-acts-and-regulations.html>. 
41 The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (KEN), No 9 0f 2009, online: 
<http://frc.go.ke/downloads/category/2-acts-and-regulations.html>. 
42 Maryanne Gicobi, “Kenyan president signs anti-money laundering Bill to law”, The East African (3 March 2017), 
online: <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Kenyan-president-signs-anti-money-laundering-Bill-to-
law/2560-3836038-3ec523z/index.html>. 
43 The Constitution of Kenya,  2010, art. 79, online: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c8508822.html>.  
44 The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Act (KEN), No 22 of 2011, online: 
<http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ken128408.pdf>. 




crimes, their investigation and prosecution. A new body, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission (EACC) was created and charged with the mandate previously granted to the KACC. 
However, as a result of numerous challenges, the EACC has been unable to live up to expectations 
in the fight against corruption and impunity.45 
Despite this panoply of Anti-Corruption legislations and the broadened scope of the 
mechanisms for corruption prevention and punishment, Kenya remains one of the most corrupt 
countries in the world with a culture of impunity that continues to fuel the embers of corruption 
already existing in the country. Within the context of human rights and accountability, impunity 
refers to the failure by society to bring perpetrators of human rights violations and economic crimes 
to justice.46The legal framework currently in place to battle corruption is clearly inadequate. As 
such, ‘it has been argued that there is a need to consolidate the various laws into a new, 
comprehensive and coordinated legal framework in order to enhance anti-corruption efforts.47 In 
addition, there is a need to strengthen the implementation of the existing laws and policies.  
 
III.  SOCIAL RIGHTS AND CORRUPTION: WHY SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION IS A BAR 
TO PROGRESSIVE REALIZATION OF ESCRS 
 
Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR imposes an obligation on state parties to the covenant as follows: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.48 
 
The reference to “resource availability” reflects a recognition that the realization of these 
rights can be hampered by a lack of resources and can be achieved only over a period of time. 
However, the emphasis must be on a genuine lack of resources in a given state. If state resources 
                                                 
45 Grace K. Injene and Catherine Ngahu, “Challenges Faced By the Kenya Ethics and Anticorruption Commission in 
Implementing the Strategies Recommended By United Nation Convention against Corruption in Kenya” (2016) 1:1 
EJBSM, online: <https://www.iprjb.org/journals/index.php/EJBSM/article/view/18>.  
46 Kenya Human Rights Commission, “Lest we Forget: The Faces of Impunity in Kenya” (2011), online: 
<https://www.khrc.or.ke/publications/30-lest-we-forget-the-faces-of-impunity-in-kenya/file.html>. 
47 Institute of Chartered Public Accountants Kenya, “The Current Challenges in Enforcing the Anti-Corruption and 
Economic Crimes Act”, online: <https://www.icpak.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/THE-Challenges-In-
Enforcing-the-Anti-Corruption-and-Economic-Crimes-Act.pdf>.  
48 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 3 UNTS 993 (entered into 
force 3 January 1976), online: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html>.  
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have been misappropriated through corruption an assessment whether the state in question is acting 
subject to the requirement of resource availability may be difficult to prove. 
While it has hindered the ability of numerous governments to meet their obligations, 
corruption was not specifically addressed by the CESCR in its General Comment on the nature of 
state obligations (or in fact, in any of the later General Comments).49 The only reference to 
“maximum of its available resources requirement” was the explanation that these resources include 
those generated within a State and those from the international community through international 
cooperation and assistance. However, to its credit, the CESCR has noted the challenge of 
corruption in some of its concluding observations on state reports. For example, in its concluding 
observations on the initial report presented by Kenya in 2008, the CESCR noted that corruption 
affects the realization of ESCRs in Kenya and that there have been few prosecutions. The 
Committee recommended: 
that the State party intensify its efforts to prosecute cases of corruption and review its 
sentencing policy for corruption-related offences. It also recommends that the State party 
train the police and other law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges on the strict 
application of anti-corruption laws, conduct awareness-raising campaigns, and ensure the 
transparency of the conduct of public authorities, in law and in practice.50 
Corruption reduces the resources available for a state to meet its obligations under the 
covenant. The failure by a state to adequately deal with corruption, for instance by putting in place 
an efficient anti-corruption policy and implementing it, could amount to a violation of human 
rights in general and ESCRs in particular. In the following sections I will give concrete examples 
of how corruption has been and continues to be an impediment to the realization of ESCRs in 
Kenya. 
 
A. THE TRIPARTITE NATURE OF STATE OBLIGATIONS 
 
Human Rights have been said to give rise to three types of obligations; the obligations to respect, 
protect, and fulfil human rights.51 In turn, the obligation to fulfil contains the obligations to 
                                                 
49 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), “General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States 
Parties' Obligations”, E/1991/23, (1990), art 2, para 1, online: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838e10.html>. 
50 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations, Kenya, UNESCOR, 2008, UN Doc 
E/C.12/KEN/CO/1, online:  <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/E.C.12.KEN.CO.1_EN.pdf>. 
51 This tripartite division was introduced for the first time in UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), “General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health”, E/C.12/2000/4, 
(2000), art 12, para 37, online: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838d0.html>. 




facilitate, provide and promote.52 The obligation to respect is essentially a negative obligation to 
refrain from infringements. It requires states to refrain from direct or indirect interference with the 
enjoyment of rights. On the other hand, the obligation to protect primarily requires the government 
to protect individuals from third party violations. A state is expected to establish measures that 
prevent third parties from interfering with the rights in question. Finally, the obligation to fulfil 
requires positive action by the State. In this regard a state should adopt appropriate legislative, 
administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures towards the full realization of 
the rights in question. Within the sphere of ESRs I would argue that a government that fails to deal 
with corruption inevitably breaches the three types of obligations outlined above.53 
With reference to the obligation to respect, there is an expectation that the government will 
not interfere with enjoyment of rights, whether directly or indirectly. In a situation where 
corruption is unchecked, the ability of ESRs right holders to enjoy these rights is impinged upon. 
This may happen in two ways. First, corrupt state officials with control over resources may require 
an illegal tax, such as a bribe, before allowing right holders to enjoy access to health, education or 
even government housing. This is a direct interference with the enjoyment of rights because an 
individual who is unable to pay the illegal tax will be denied the opportunity to access the social 
amenity in question.  
Secondly, when a state fails to put in place adequate anti-corruption policies, thereby letting 
corruption thrive undeterred, it inadvertently creates a situation where ESRs right holders are 
unable to benefit from the real-life tangible effects of the rights in question. For instance, of what 
value is a constitutionally guaranteed right to health if money meant for the health sector is diverted 
to private uses rather than public ones through corrupt activities? This amounts to an indirect 
interference with the rights in question.  
The obligation to protect requires the state to ensure that third parties do not interfere with 
rights holders’ ability to enjoy their rights, and to provide effective remedies when interferences 
occur. However, in a country plagued by systemic corruption it may be possible for third parties 
to ride roughshod over right holders thereby infringing their ESRs. By tilting the scales of justice, 
corruption in the judiciary or in the executive branch of government could translate into a failure 
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by the authorities to take legal action against such third parties to the detriment of rights holders.  
As such, an omission by the state to regulate the activities of individuals, groups or even 
corporations may result in a violation of ESRs because rampant corruption constitutes a permanent 
structural danger to numerous human rights.54  
The obligation to fulfil demands certain positive actions from the state in question. Where 
a state fails to tackle corruption, this may mean violations on several fronts. From a legislative and 
judicial perspective this may imply that the state has failed to put in place adequate legislation to 
prevent corruption or to ensure a properly functioning judiciary that will punish wrong-doers once 
caught. From a budgetary standpoint, public funds may be diverted to corrupt ventures thereby 
diminishing the government’s ability to deliver on the promise of ESRs.  
 
B. CORRUPTION AND ARTICLE 2 (1) OF THE ICESCR 
 
Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR, already reproduced above, is crucial because it sets out the 
fundamental obligations of the States parties in enforcement of ESRs. It has been argued to contain 
four key components that are subject to monitoring by the CESCR.55 I posit that a state that fails 
to put in place and/or implement adequate anti-corruption measures inadvertently violates each of 
those four requirements. 
The first duty of states in this regard is “to take steps”. These steps, according to the 
CESCR, must be deliberate, concrete and targeted56. States are given room to determine which 
measures will be suitable for ensuring that ESRs are realized. These may be legislative, 
administrative, judicial, economic, social and educational measures, consistent with the nature of 
the rights.57If a government fails to put in place and implement an effective anti-corruption policy 
within its jurisdiction this implicitly creates an obstacle to the achievement of ESRs. In this sense 
therefore such a government can be said to be breaching its article 2 (1) obligation to take steps. 
The second component of the obligation of states is that the State party in question must 
take these steps “with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
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recognized”.58 This means that states should move as expeditiously as possible to ensure that ESRs 
are realized within their respective jurisdictions. The obligation of progressive achievement exists 
independently of the availability of resources. The obligation requires the effective use of 
resources available.59 When systemic corruption leads to the looting of public coffers, resources 
that could otherwise have been utilized in realization of ESCRs are significantly diminished. This 
ineffective use of state resources could amount to a failure by the state to meet its obligations under 
the ICESCR. 
The third element is to exhaust all possibilities that the State has at its disposal “to the 
maximum of its available resources”.60 How are the available resources in a state party 
determined? The onus is upon the State party itself to make this determination and to set out what 
the maximum is. The CESCR has acknowledged that states have a wide margin of appreciation to 
determine the optimum use of their resources and to adopt national policies and prioritize certain 
resource demands over others.61However, as part of its mandate, the CESCR has the authority to 
assess whether a state has made equitable and effective use of available resources. While the 
CESCR has not yet made a determination that the existence of runaway corruption is a violation 
of the obligation to take steps subject to the maximum of available resources requirement, it is not 
inconceivable that in a situation where the OP-ICESCR is invoked in order to allege that ESRs 
have been violated because of the existence of systemic corruption they could very well do so. In 
my opinion, this opens the door for the CESCR to validly assert that a state party that has allowed 
corruption to run rampant has failed to equitably and effectively use its available resources thereby 
breaching its obligations under the ICESCR. It is interesting to note that even though the CESCR 
has been lauded as being the UN treaty body that has paid most attention to questions of corruption 
when issuing concluding observations62 it has thus far failed to specifically address the impact of 
corruption on ESRs. It’s recommendations have more often than not been of a general nature 
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related to the state obligations under article 2.63 Perhaps it would be useful for the committee to 
devote some time to the question of the relationship between corruption and ESRs.  
The fourth component of the fundamental obligations set out in article 2 (1) of the ICESCR 
requires states to employ all appropriate means “individually and through international assistance 
and co-operation especially economic and technical”. The conduct of the state in question should 
be reasonably calculated to realize the enjoyment of a particular right (s).64 Within the context of 
the fight against corruption it may be argued that article 2 (1) obligates the state to seek 
international assistance in combating corruption, or dealing with perpetrators, if it is unable to do 
so on its own. For instance, Kenyan law requires the existence of a bilateral extradition treaty 
between Kenya and other States in all criminal cases, including corruption related matters.65 The 
Government could seek the assistance of other states in ensuring that these treaties are enacted and 
implemented in order to guarantee that culprits who divert state funds to the detriment of ESRs 
realization can be held to account.  
Given the above analysis, a State party which fails to comply with any of the four 
requirements under article 2(1) of the ICESCR can be said to be in breach of its treaty obligations. 
The existing CESCR monitoring procedures can be used to make the authoritative determination 
that a State like Kenya burdened by systemic and rampant corruption is violating its fundamental 
obligations arising from the ICESCR by pursuing a deficient anti-corruption policy. 
 
IV. CORRUPTION AND ITS IMPACT ON SPECIFIC ESRS IN KENYA 
 
A. “STARVING FOR JUSTICE” - CORRUPTION AND THE RIGHT TO FOOD 
 
Article 43(1) (c) of the Constitution of Kenya provides that every person has the right to be free 
from hunger, and to have adequate food of acceptable quality. The CESCR has elaborated upon 
the nature of state obligations in the context of the right to food in their General Comment No. 12. 
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Many Kenyans suffer as a result of a lack of adequate food. The root cause of hunger and 
malnutrition are not always lack of food per se but lack of access to available food. Access to food 
may be limited by factors such as corruption.  
According to the CESCR, rights holders should have physical and economic access at all 
times to adequate food or the means for its procurement. Where a State party argues that resource 
constraints make it impossible to provide access to food for those who are unable by themselves 
to secure such access the State has to demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all the 
resources at its disposal in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.66 
This means that where corruption reduces the state’s ability to provide access to food (for example 
by creating an artificial resource shortage) there will, ipso facto, be a breach of the ICESCR. 
Corrupt governments are unlikely to create and implement sound long-term agricultural 
policies, including land tenure and water management, because of the institutional instability that 
thrives in such situations.67 Corruption widens the already cavernous gap between the “haves” and 
the “have-nots’ in countries such as Kenya. It inhibits social and economic development, impacting 
negatively on attempts by international as well as regional development institutions to fight hunger 
and famine coherently and systematically.68 Corruption may also distort the working of the price 
mechanism characteristic of free market economic systems where artificial shortages push prices 
of foodstuffs upwards.  
In 2012, officials of the Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers (KENFAP) 
accused the government of economic sabotage. According to KENFAP, government corruption 
led to artificial food shortages in the Rift Valley province. Specifically, the government was 
accused of deliberately and consistently delaying the disbursement of funds to the National Cereals 
and Produce Board (hereinafter, the NCPB) for the buying of maize. KENFAP alleged that such 
delays forced farmers to sell their produce at throwaway prices to agents working with high 
                                                 
66 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), “General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate 
Food”, (1999), art 2, para 1, online: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838c11.html>. 
67 Florence Ngozi Uchendu and Thaddeus Olatunbosun Abolarin, “Corrupt Practices Negatively Influenced Food 
Security and Life Expectancy in Developing Countries” (2015) 20 PAMJ, online: 
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4458312/>.  
68 Ibid. 
78 THE TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW                                              [VOL 5] 
 
powered syndicates connected to government operatives. The maize was then sold by the 
syndicates at inflated prices in times of scarcity or exported at high prices.69  
Corruption in relation to the right to food in Kenya also occurs in the context of food 
assistance programs in times of drought relief. Food assistance programs have represented the 
largest component of humanitarian assistance in Kenya for many years, and have been the most 
consistently funded.70 In the 2011 drought response, food aid was identified as one of the areas 
most vulnerable to corruption and diversion. This was primarily due to the scale of food aid 
programs, scattered dispersion as well as weaknesses in transparency and accountability 
mechanisms. Food meant for relief efforts was diverted physically through transport and storage, 
and indirectly through manipulation of targeting and registration.71 In West Pokot County, a 
District Commissioner was arrested in September 2011 and charged with stealing 280 bags of 
maize worth KSh1.2million that was part of a food aid program and employees of the NCPB were 
also charged with selling relief food. When public officers (mis)use their positions for private gain 
in this way this can be classified as corruption. Specifically, section 45 of the Anti-Corruption and 
Economic Crimes Act72 defines corruption to include any fraudulent or unlawful acquisition of 
public property. Section 46 thereafter provides that any person who uses his office to improperly 
confer a benefit on himself or anyone else is guilty of a corruption offense.  In situations such as 
these, corruption deprives ordinary citizens of the constitutionally enshrined rights that should 
accrue to them, such as right to food, and condemns right holders to suffer unjustifiable violations. 
 
B. “AN UNHEALTHY STATE OF AFFAIRS” - CORRUPTION AND THE RIGHT TO 
HEALTH 
 
Article 43(1) of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution provides that every person has a right to the highest 
attainable standard of health which includes the right to healthcare services. The content of the 
right to health has been elaborated upon by the CESCR to include availability (functioning  public  
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health  and  health-care  facilities,  goods  and  services, as well as programs, have to be available 
in sufficient quantity within the State  party), accessibility (health facilities have to be both 
physically and economically accessible) and quality (As  well  as  being  culturally  acceptable,  
health  facilities,  goods  and  services  must  also  be  scientifically  and  medically  appropriate  
and  of  good  quality).73 
Unfortunately, the enjoyment of the right to health in Kenya is compromised by many 
factors including poor governance and corruption. Corruption affects all health systems, whether 
public or private, with the poor bearing a disproportionate portion of the poor service delivery 
burden. It reduces the resources needed for healthcare and lowers the quality, equity and 
effectiveness of health care services.74 In extreme cases, corruption in the healthcare system can 
degenerate into a life or death scenario for vulnerable right holders, for instance, where sick 
persons have to pay a bribe in order to be treated at health facilities.75 
Corruption also impacts the right to health in other discrete and interconnected ways. A 
Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission report has identified examples of corrupt practices within the 
public health sector that are likely to impede the realization of the right to health76. They include 
manipulation of the tendering system, misappropriation of drugs and other supplies, procurement 
of sub-standard/poor quality commodities and equipment, hoarding of supplies and inflation of 
prices.  Other malpractices include bribery, embezzlement of funds, favoritism/tribalism/nepotism, 
unnecessary referrals to private clinics, extortion and misappropriation of procurement funds.77 
The report confirmed that as resources are drained from health budgets, less funding is available 
for operations and maintenance, leading to de-motivated staff, poor quality of care, and reduced 
service availability and use. The informal user payments increase the cost of accessing health care 
services, rendering them inaccessible to the poor which has serious implications for their ability to 
enjoy the right to health78.  
In 2012, the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) corruption saga revealed the depth 
of corruption in the Kenyan health sector. Millions of shillings released by the NHIF allegedly 
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disappeared down the drain of phantom hospitals.79 Episodes like this have obvious implications 
for access public health care services in terms of availability and economic accessibility. Diversion 
of funds means that there are fewer public health facilities than there should be, and that for the 
existing facilities the costs of service provision are higher. Invariably, it is difficult for low income 
earners to be able to access these services. 
As recently as 2017, the U.S. government suspended $21 million in direct aid to Kenya's 
Ministry of Health amid concerns over corruption80. In a statement justifying their action, the US 
Embassy said, “We took this step because of ongoing concern about reports of corruption and 
weak accounting procedures at the Ministry”. The Embassy further stated that they were “working 
with the Ministry on ways to improve accounting and internal controls.” The so-called Afya House 
scandal, named after the building housing the Ministry of Health, was based on an audit report 
leaked to Kenyan media in October. The audit showed the ministry could not account for 5 billion 
Kenyan shillings (US$49 million) and that funds meant for free maternity care had been diverted.81 
Afya means health in Swahili, which would be a misnomer given that the ministry of health is 
clearly not in good health because of this and other scandals that have plagued it. 
 
 
C. “WHO TAUGHT YOU TO STEAL?” - CORRUPTION AND THE RIGHT TO 
EDUCATION 
The right to education is a fundamental human right guaranteed under section 43(1) (f) of the 
Kenyan Constitution. In delineating the ambit of the right to education, the CESCR has urged that 
education should be available which means that functioning educational institutions and programs 
have to be available in sufficient quantity within the jurisdiction of the State party. It should also 
be accessible. This encompasses non-discrimination, as well as physical and economic 
accessibility. Education should also be acceptable. This means that the form and substance of 
education, including curricula and teaching methods, should be acceptable (e.g. relevant, culturally 
appropriate and of good quality) to students and, in appropriate cases to the parents as well. Finally, 
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education should be adaptable, meaning that it should be flexible so it can adapt to the needs of 
changing societies and communities.82 
Corruption in the Kenyan education sector manifests itself in many ways. This includes 
collection of illegal/extra school fees, embezzlement and misappropriation of funds allocated to 
the education budgets, fraud in academic performance assessment, among others.83As a 
consequence of these and other corrupt activities in the education sector, children lose 
opportunities to attend school.  The high burden of illegal school fees for families leads to high 
dropout rates. Corruption in management, selection and recruitment of teachers leads to lower 
teaching quality. And corruption in procuring educational equipment and supplies leads to 
shortages of classrooms, teaching equipment, textbooks and other supplies.84 
Free Primary Education, FPE is probably one of the best as well as worst things to have 
happened in the Kenya education sector in recent times. Launched in 2003 by the then President 
Mwai Kibaki’s government, FPE offered hope to millions of poor children in Kenya who had 
before then been unable to attend school. However, since its inception, the FPE has been marred 
with irregularities including misappropriation and embezzlement of its funds. For instance, in 
2011, donors such as the UK government demanded refunds of their FPE contributions due to 
large scale theft by public officials.85 More recently, a 2015 report by the Ethics and Anti-
Corruption Commission, titled Examination into the Disbursement and Utilization of Free Primary 
Education Funds, unearthed massive fraud in the procurement of school supplies.86 The Ministry 
of Education ironically fails the test when it comes to proper use of public funds for purposes of 
actualizing the right to education in Kenya. 
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V.  HOPE SPRINGS ETERNAL: THE OP-ICESCR AND THE POTENTIAL IT HOLDS 
FOR REDRESS 
 
To date, 16687 states have ratified the ICESCR and are therefore obliged to respect, protect and 
fulfil the rights protected by the Covenant. Before the coming into force of the OP-ICESCR, the 
only international mechanism monitoring the implementation of ESRs under the ICESCR was the 
state reporting procedure. Every five years, a state party was expected to submit a report to the 
CESCR outlining how it is fulfilling its treaty obligations. In turn, the CESCR would issue 
concluding observations on the basis of matters raised in the state reports. While civil society had 
the opportunity to present alternative information to the Committee in the form of shadow reports, 
the CESCR lacked the mandate to deal with individual complaints of rights violations. However, 
with the coming into force of the OP-ICESCR, states that ratify the Optional Protocol grant the 
CESCR the individual complaints mandate, allowing it to assess whether a state has complied with 
its human rights obligations in specific cases. This may explain the reluctance of states to ratify 
the OP-ICESCR and accounts for the current low number of only 23 state parties to the OP-
ICESCR.88 
Kenya has not ratified the OP-ICESCR. However, the government has indicated that it is 
actively considering its ratification.89 The following analysis is conducted on an assumption of 
what could transpire in the event that the Kenyan Government does ratify the OP-ICESCR. The 
point is to show that the OP-ICESCR is a powerful tool that could and ought to be utilized in the 
on-going national and global fight against corruption. 
The OP-ICESCR includes three procedures: an individual communications procedure, an 
inquiries procedure and an inter-states procedure. During ratification, each state has to indicate 
which of these procedures it will adhere to.  I will argue that either the individual communications 
procedure or the inquiries procedure has potential to allow for CESCR involvement in cases of 
systemic corruption. In these instances, the CESCR will assess the case before it and make suitable 
recommendations. Granted, the CESCR is not a Court and therefore lacks the power to compel 
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states to comply with these recommendations. Nevertheless, recommendations by the CESCR 
made pursuant to the invocation of any of the procedures under the OP-ICESCR can strengthen 
the public and legal struggles of right holders. By treating corruption related ESRs violations cases 
with the gravitas they deserve, and imbuing the claims of ESRs violation with a much-needed 
legitimacy, the Committee could pressure recalcitrant governments to take necessary actions.  
The paper deliberately excludes from its scrutiny the potential use of the inter-state 
procedure in cases where the existence of corruption and an ineffective anti-corruption framework 
is argued to be a violation of ESRs. This is because similar mechanisms in other international 
human rights law treaties are notorious for their under usage.90  Of specific concern is the fact that 
for the inter-state procedure to apply there is a “double opt-in” requirement. Both the state alleging 
that another state is in violation of its ESRs obligations, as well as the errant state must recognize 
the competence of the CESCR to hear inter-state complaints. The double opt-in requirement 
conceivably makes it difficult for a state to “cast the first stone”, because this may likely open it 
up to similar actions or reactions. As argued elsewhere, the implementation of the inter-state 
procedure is often perceived to be politically motivated and as a result potentially too damaging 
and threatening for a state’s interests.91 This undoubtedly reduces the utility of this particular 
mechanism by increasing the chances of non-use by concerned state parties. 
 
A. THE COMPLAINTS OR INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE UNDER 
THE OP-ICESCR 
 
There are two key procedural concerns that need to be considered in order to understand the 
potential application of the individual communications mechanism. These are questions of 
jurisdiction and the requirements for admissibility. 
Regarding jurisdiction, Article 2 of the OP-ICESCR delineates the scope of the 
communications procedure in a number of ways. It elucidates upon the subject matter jurisdiction 
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of the CESCR as well as identifies who has locus standi to bring communications before the 
CESCR.92  
On subject matter jurisdiction, article 2 provides that communications may be submitted 
by or on behalf of any individuals and/or groups claiming to be victims of “a violation of any of 
the ESRs set forth in the covenant…”93 The rights holders may claim violations of any and all of 
the rights of the covenant without restriction. During the working group sessions for the drafting 
of the OP-ICESRC, a suggestion to include an à la carte approach under which each state party to 
the protocol would have the option to choose which rights would come under the discretion of the 
CESCR was rightfully rejected.94 This approach, if it had been adopted, would arguably have 
created a hierarchy amongst the various ESRs and lent credence to the mistaken notion that human 
rights are not interdependent and indivisible. It would implicitly suggest that while the protection 
of Civil and Political Rights does not allow exceptions (Since the OP-ICCPR does not have an 
opt-in procedure for certain rights), states have discretion as to which ESRs can and ought to be 
protected.95 
On the question of locus standi, the operative section is article 2 which provides that: 
Communications may be submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, 
under the jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the 
economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the Covenant by that State Party. Where a 
communication is submitted on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, this shall be 
with their consent unless the author can justify acting on their behalf without such 
consent.96 
 An analysis of the above provision reveals that the following categories of persons will be 
able to lodge complaints with the CESCR: 
i. Individuals who claim to be victims of violations of the covenant 
ii. Groups of individuals who claim to be victims of violations of the covenant 
iii. Third parties acting on behalf of the persons in (i) and (ii) above with their consent 
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iv. Third parties acting on behalf of the persons in (i) and (ii) above without their consent 
but without justification for the lack of such consent.97 
The latitude given to third parties in the above instances is in recognition of the fact that victims 
of rights violations may not always be in a position to act for themselves or to appoint 
representatives. It is therefore a necessary flexibility device aimed at ensuring justice. 
In terms of admissibility, for communications to the Committee to be admissible, the 
complainants must have exhausted all available domestic remedies.98 However, this requirement 
may be dispensed with where the procedure to obtain such remedies is unreasonably prolonged. It 
has been argued that the CESCR should also consider situations where remedies do not exist or 
where they exist are not effective.99 It would be unreasonable and contrary to the spirit of the 
communications procedure for the CESCR to insist upon the exhaustion of remedies known to be 
ineffective. 
The OP-ICESCR contains a novel provision not found in other universal treaty mechanisms. 
It places a temporal limit of one year from the date of exhaustion of remedies to presentation of a 
complaint unless the applicant can explain the failure to submit within this deadline.100 
Additionally, the jurisdiction ratione temporis of the CESCR is limited to matters that take place 
after the entry into place of the OP-ICESCR for the state in question.101 However, an important 
caveat exists; the CESCR is allowed to investigate violations of ESRs that may have begun prior 
to the entry into force of the OP-ICESCR for the state party involved but which continued 
thereafter. This issue was canvassed by the CESCR in the first case dealt with under this 
procedure.102 Specifically, the CESCR noted that some of the facts that gave rise to the violations 
alleged by the complainant occurred before but continued after the May 5, 2013 which is the date 
the OP-ICESCR came into force for Spain.103 
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Of concern on the question whether the CESCR can deal with cases where the existence of 
corruption and an ineffective anti-corruption framework can be argued to be a violation of ESRs 
is the provision in article 3(2)(e) of the OP-ICESCR. That article states that a communication is 
inadmissible where it is not sufficiently substantiated or is exclusively based on reports 
disseminated by mass media. This is because within the Kenyan context, information about the 
myriad corruption scandals has mostly been made public through mass media. The Government 
has been unsurprisingly tight lipped in issuing information about the seedy details of the numerous 
instances where taxpayer’s funds have been misappropriated by corrupt government officials. 
However, a practical reality that can circumvent this apparent difficulty exists. It is difficult to 
imagine a complaint submitted by the alleged victim (s) on the sole basis of media reports. The 
whole point of being called a victim or alleging to be one is that the individual (s) in question must 
have personally suffered as a result of the action or inaction alleged. The existence of proximity 
between the legal breach complained of (existence of corruption and a failure to implement an 
effective anti-corruption framework in a particular case) and an injury (the violation of a specified 
ESRs as proven on the basis of evidence) may indicate a sufficient causal link allowing the victim 
to seek redress under the OP-ICESCR.104 
The CESCR also has the power to decline to consider a communication where it does not reveal 
that the author has suffered a clear disadvantage, unless it considers that the communication raises 
a serious issue of general importance.105 This is an unprecedented clause in communications 
procedures established under human rights treaties within the universal system.106 In my opinion, 
cases where systemic corruption undermines the very fabric of a society, thus threatening the well-
being of rights holders, serious issues of general importance are raised.  
 
B. THE INQUIRIES PROCEDURE UNDER THE OP-ICESCR 
Article 11 of the OP-ICESCR provides for an inquiry procedure as another potential mechanism 
to spur the CESCR into action. In these instances, the CESCR can receive reliable information 
indicating grave or systematic violations by a state party of any of the ESRs under the ICESCR. 
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The CESCR will invite the state party in question to cooperate in the examination of the 
information received. The process will culminate with the CESCR conducting a confidential 
inquiry and transmitting its results to the state party together with any comments and 
recommendations. Within six months of receiving the communication from the CESCR the state 
party in question shall submit its observations to the committee. 
It would seem that the inquiries procedure offers an easier route to invoke the jurisdiction 
of the CESCR as compared to the complaints procedure discussed above. This is because article 
11 does not elucidate upon any admissibility criteria. The information before the CESCR need not 
identify the victims of the alleged violations. This allows information to be given anonymously, 
which in turn increases chances that potential victims may share information with the CESCR 
without fear of reprisals. Additionally, there is no requirement that domestic remedies must be 
exhausted before the CESCR can launch such an inquiry. The exhaustion of domestic remedies 
rule, which is a significant procedural obstacle under the communications procedure, does not 
apply here. Information may therefore be submitted and considered at any time after the date on 
which the alleged violation occurred.107  Two major definitional issues are raised by the wording 
of article 11 and are worthy of further discussion. They will be considered in turn. 
 
C. “GRAVE OR SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS” 
The choice to give mandate to the CESCR only in cases where violations are grave or systematic 
may appear deliberate, in order to foreclose the use of the inquiry procedure in frivolous or 
vexatious cases. The CESCR is permitted scrutiny of only the most severe, persistent or 
widespread violations of the ICESCR.108 The inquiry procedure is investigatory and fact- finding 
in nature and allows the CESCR to visit the territory of the state in question in order to carry out 
in situ inspections of sites connected to the alleged violations and to interview any persons with 
pertinent information. Such visits can only occur if the state party alleged to be in violation 
consents.109 This differs from the debatably quasi-judicial role played by the CESCR under the 
communications procedure highlighted above.  
The term “grave” has been frequently used by various UN bodies in the context of all 
human rights without distinction on the basis of CPRs or ESRs. It is sometimes interchanged with 
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the words “serious” or “severe”. Gravity in this context denotes the aggravated nature of the 
violations in question, the extremity of their consequences as well as the vulnerability of the 
victims of the rights violation. In analyzing whether a violation may be considered to be grave, the 
following factors may be considered: the degree to which rights are infringed, the nature of the 
rights infringed, the number and status of the victims affected by the violations, the immediate and 
long-term consequences of the violations including effects on other rights.110 
On the other hand, the term “systematic” could imply regularity of the violation, and may 
include elements of planning, organization and structure. More specifically, a systematic violation 
is one that occurs repeatedly on a large scale and that is authorized and/or sanctioned by the state 
in question through its action or inaction as the case may be. A state’s failure to put in place 
measures to end violations in such instances breeds a culture of impunity that belies arguments of 
a lack of complicity on the part of the state. Repeated occurrence means that the violations are not 
isolated or random, but take place recurrently over a period of time that is sufficient for the state 
to be aware of their persistent nature and take effective action to end them. On the other hand, 
large or wide scale could mean that the violations involve a significant number of victims or are 
geographically widespread.111 
Article 11 provides for the violations in question to be either grave or systematic by using 
the disjunctive “or” as opposed to the conjunctive “and”. This implies that victims of rights 
violation need to prove the existence of one or the other factor, but not both. This implicitly reduces 
the burden of proof borne in such instances. In reality the violations complained of could be either 
grave or systematic or a combination of both. The intricacies of the situation will thus dictate the 
evidence necessary. 
 
D. “RELIABLE INFORMATION” 
 
The inquiry procedure is initiated when the CESCR exercises its discretion to begin inquiries after 
receiving reliable information. The notion of reliability of information is an objective or intrinsic 
characteristic of evidence. Information is reliable when it is logically probative or dis-probative of 
a fact which is in issue. A number of factors may aid the analysis of whether information can be 
considered to be reliable or not. These include: the internal consistency of the information provided 
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by a single source, the consistency among accounts of the situation from different sources, whether 
the evidence is corroborated by independent sources, the specificity of the allegations in question, 
the source’s record (where one exists) of reliability and fact finding and the extent to which they 
are independent and non-partisan.112 It must be appreciated that a prior record of communication 
of reliable information is not a mandatory requirement for a source to be considered to be credible. 
Information may still pass muster even if it comes from a new source who has had no previous 
contact with the CESCR and lacks an established record in fact-finding and reporting. 
The inquiries procedure has been praised for its potential to allow analysis of systemic and 
structural inequalities that go beyond the circumstances of individual cases, to address causal 
factors and thus proffer structural solutions. It can accommodate attention to the wider economic, 
social, political and cultural context at the national level and to the transnational dimensions of 
violations, thereby encouraging a holistic understanding of the violations claimed.113 It is precisely 
for this reason that the inquiries mechanism under the OP-ICESCR is a formidable tool that may 
be added to the arsenal of countries and institutions that are struggling to wage a battle against 
systemic corruption. 
 
VI. LET'S PUT IT TO THE TEST: HOW THE OP-ICESCR POTENTIALLY ALLOWS 
RIGHTS HOLDERS TO CHALLENGE SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION WITHIN THEIR 
JURISDICTIONS 
 
In 2013 an interesting case was brought before the Constitutional and Human Rights Division of 
the High Court of Kenya sitting in Nairobi.114 The petitioners, an association of concerned 
residents in the town of Githunguri brought a case against the Cabinet Secretary in the Ministry of 
Education, the Attorney General and the District Education Board of Githunguri among other 
respondents. Petitioners averred that a number of irregularities and malpractices had marred the 
running of the public schools in the Githunguri school district therefore resulting into a violation 
of the constitutionally enshrined right to education for the affected students. The hallmark of the 
petition was allegations of corruption in the running of the various schools in the district to the 
detriment of free primary education recipients. It was further argued that the matter was first 
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brought before the attention of the District Education Board without any remedial action being 
taken and then to the Commission on Administrative Justice (commonly referred to as the office 
of the Ombudsman) without any tangible resolution of the grievances raised.  
This failure to secure adequate remedies precipitated the entreaty of the High Court’s 
jurisdiction. The High Court ruled in favor of the petitioners but only on the ground of levying of 
illegal fees. The court declined to consider all the other grounds that had been raised in the petition 
such as allegations of election malpractices in the Boards of Governors of the various schools, 
nepotism, illegal and corrupt tendering processes, receipt of unauthorized money for use of school 
grounds, disappearance of school resources such as books among other enumerated grounds. Had 
the petitioners in this case chosen to pursue the matter within the context of the OP-ICESCR 
(assuming Kenya was a state party) I believe that they would have been able to satisfy the 
jurisdictional and admissibility requirements under the ICESCR. 
First, the right to education is one of the rights enshrined by the ICESRC and as such 
allegations that corruption has led to infringement of this right would give the CESCR the mandate 
to listen to the complaints. Secondly, the Githunguri Residents Association was made up of the 
parents and guardians of students who had suffered in one way or another as a result of corrupt 
practices. For instance, students who were unable to pay the illegal fees were not allowed to access 
the school premises. These petitioners would therefore fit the bill of third parties acting on behalf 
of victims of violations whether with or without consent as provided for under the OP-ICESCR. 
On the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies, it is apparent that the rights holders 
attempted to seek redress within the municipal framework but were only minimally successful 
even after going through the court process. An argument could therefore be made that having 
exhausted domestic remedies in that case, the CESCR is the next logical forum for raising their 
grievances. The sentiments raised in the above case as regards the administration of the Free 
Primary Education System in Kenya have been echoed by other persons.115 It is widely accepted 
that cases of corruption and embezzlement have been emblematic since the program was started 
in 2003. Schools all over the country have been affected as a result and the enjoyment of the right 
                                                 
115 Adrienne Chuck, “Disparities in the System: The Effects of Free Primary Education (FPE) on the Quality of 
Education in Nairobi’s Public Schools” (2009), online: 
<https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1715&context=isp_collection
>. 




to education compromised for the millions of students who depend on the program. As such, this 
is certainly a serious issue of general importance that could warrant the committee’s attention. 
 
A. INQUIRING FOR TRUTH – SYSTEMATIC CORRUPTION AS A GRAVE 
VIOLATION OF ESCRS 
 
Over the past couple of years, the Kenya Auditor General’s reports of the financial performance 
of both the National and County Governments have revealed shocking levels of multi-sectoral 
corruption. For the financial year ended June 2016, an audit of the Nairobi County Assembly Board 
Mortgage Scheme Fund resulted in an adverse opinion as a result of missing monies, inaccurate 
balances and doubtful loans extended to members of the assembly in dubious circumstances.116 In 
the report for the financial year 2014/2015, the Auditor General said that government spending 
worth 450 Billion shillings was not properly accounted for, demonstrating “persistent and 
disturbing problems in collection and accounting for revenue.”117 Corruption appears to be a way 
of life in most national and county government entities with the chairman of the Ethics and Anti-
Corruption Commission arguing that Kenya loses a third of its state budget to corruption every 
year.118 
The examples of corruption scandals highlighted in this paper paint a grim picture of a 
country that is struggling under the weight of corruption, and yet seems unwilling or unable to put 
the load down. Despite the existence of numerous anti-corruption laws, the number of successful 
prosecutions especially where high ranking government officials are alleged to have been involved 
in corruption are minimal. Assuming that Kenya ratifies the OP-ICESCR, would it be possible for 
the CESCR to turn its inquiring gaze on this sad state of affairs? 
In a country like Kenya where corruption is systemic and multi-sectoral spanning both the 
national and the county governments, the article 11 requirement of grave or systematic violations 
could be easily met. Corruption in Kenya is not an isolated incident. It is a series of widespread 
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and repeated occurrences affecting all areas of the public service. The failure of successive regimes 
to properly prosecute offenders has bred a culture of impunity that implies state toleration of 
corruption despite its adverse impact on achievement of ESRs. Additionally, the sheer number of 
victims who have suffered violations as a result of corruption shows that this is a grave issue 
worthy of the CESCR’s investigation. Corruption in Kenya has impaired the achievement of the 
right to education, the right to food, the right to social security, and the right to health. In the long 
term, these rights will never be truly realized if resources that could have been used in providing 
them keep getting siphoned off to corrupt ventures. Progressive realization in this case may very 
well be a journey without a destination. 
Finally, there is a wealth of evidence from the office of the auditor-general and other 
dependable sources, such as the Kenya National Human Rights Commission, illustrating the high 
levels of corruption in both levels of government. It is therefore plausible that as required by article 
11 there is a sufficient amount of reliable information available for the CESCR to turn its spotlight 
on Kenya in order to assess the real-life impact of runaway corruption on the achievement of 
ESCRs in the country.  
 
VII. POSTSCRIPT: SOME FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
It is anticipated under the OP-ICESCR that the CESCR will subject state actions to a 
“reasonableness” inquiry in order to decide on the existence or non-existence of violations. For 
this reason, article 8(4) of the OP-ICESCR has been referred to as the heart and pulse of the 
protocol.119 The incorporation of the reasonableness criterion into the OP-ICESCR is an 
acknowledgement that there should be a clear demarcation between the adjudicative role granted 
to the CESCR and the policy design and implementation role granted to states. Echoing separation 
of powers concerns, the aim is to equip the CESCR with the power to adjudicate and remedy claims 
addressing serious and systemic violations of ESRs under the OP-ICESCR which is critical to 
ensuring access to justice for victims of the most widespread and egregious violations.120 
In a country like Kenya where successive regimes have consistently and defiantly failed to 
tackle systemic corruption resulting in billions being pilfered from the public coffers, it is 
undoubted that long-suffering ESRs holders will continue to suffer as a result of the failures of the 
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state. In these circumstances it is certainly not unreasonable to expect the CESCR to find that such 
governments have failed the reasonableness test outlined in article 8(4). This is so especially 
because the failure to implement an adequate anti-corruption framework allows the seeds of 
corruption to flourish unchecked, and is the very antithesis of what reasonable state behavior ought 
to be in this context.  
Admittedly, the number of cases submitted to and considered by the CESCR under the OP-
ICESCR is currently very low. This may be attributed less to the difficulty in invoking the 
jurisdiction of the CESCR and more to the few number of ratifications currently enjoyed by the 
OP-ICESCR. Perhaps this hesitance by countries such as Kenya to ratify the protocol is a sign of 
a rebirth in the ESRs sphere with states that have relied on the progressive realization caveat as a 
crutch to evade their obligations under the ICESCR now realizing that the chickens are on the way 
home to roost, and that more accountability is now demanded from state parties of the ICESCR. 
Nevertheless, the list of pending cases before the committee indicates that the grievances that the 
CESCR is willing to look into are as varied as they are unpredictable. They range from matters of 
access to complementary compensation established by collective bargaining agreement121 to 
discrimination of women domestic workers in access to the national social security system122 and 
even further to donation of embryos produced by in-vitro fertilization for scientific research123. 
Corruption related ESRs violations may very well find themselves on the CESCR’s agenda sooner 
rather than later. With public sector corruption alleged to be siphoning off $ 1.5 trillion to $ 2 
trillion annually from the global economy124 it is clear that corruption is not a unique Kenyan or 
African problem. It is a global challenge that must be fought on all fronts, including the ESRs 
sphere, until it is finally won, however long that will take.  
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